OPLE

The Organization for Popular Legislative Endeavors will be founded as a 501 c4 Non-Profit. The OPLE will be created to serve as a vehicle to educate the public and to lobby to achieve the passage of legislation that serves a popular interest.

The charter is complete minus enough people to complete the incorporation and to form the board, although due to other projects I have not completed the bylaws. I am looking for people who would be interested in learning more about the organization to serve as incorporates, board members, and volunteers.

How is legislation passed in the United States? Typically, those interests that fund the campaigns of elected representatives are owed favors once elected. In addition, through fundraisers the interest of wealth and industry gain access to elected representatives. In some cases, lobbyists visit politicians with a check one week, and then visit the same politician a few weeks later with a model bill. Then the bill is sold to the public through vague slogans and spun information originating in think tanks supported by a pro-industry agenda, quoted by pundits, politicians, talk radio, print, the web, and advertising. Deception and sophistries become reality in the minds of people through repetition, not an understanding of who stands to benefit.

OPLE will use the same tactics to pass legislation that serves a popular interest, and not only my outlines, but from other members of the public. And not only will we raise funds to lobby and gain access to politicians while educating the public, but we will also have an implied voting bloc through public affiliation with the organization that can be tactfully used as leverage for policies that serve the interest of the struggling majority. Because there is “mounting evidence that when the preferences of the affluent are controlled for, the policy preferences of poor and middle income Americans typically count for little or nothing.” (1)

(1): 2012 Ferguson, Jorgensen, and Chen pg 6. (Ferguson, Thomas. 1995. “Deduced and Abandoned: Rational Expectations, the Investment Theory of Political Parties, and the Myth of the Median Voter.” Pp. 377-419 in Golden Rule, edited by T. Ferguson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)